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Abstract
Given the long roots of bay‘a (pledge of allegiance) in Islamic tradition and the controversial claim by the 
Islamic State (IS) to be a caliphate, the application of bay‘a to the group’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and 
his project is a contested issue among radical Islamists. Based on secondary literature and IS ideologues’ own 
writings, this paper analyses IS’s claims of validity in their calls for allegiance to “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
and how radical Islamist critics of IS have responded to this. IS’s arguments resemble quite closely the theories 
on bay‘a that its jihadi opponents themselves claim to adhere to. Although the latter take their inspiration from 
early Islam and far less so from the theories that developed afterwards, it sometimes also appears as if they have 
idealised the caliphate so much that they find its reality as represented by IS hard to swallow.
Keywords: Jihadism, ISIS, ideology, theology, allegiance
Introduction
After the leader of the Islamic State (IS), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared a caliphate (khilafa) on 29 June 
2014, his spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, stated that “pledging allegiance (mubaya‘a) and giving 
assistance to the caliph (khalifa) […] has become incumbent upon all Muslims.”[1] Such pledges of allegiance 
(bay‘a) have since been given by numerous radical Islamist groups from around the world, including in 
Afghanistan/Pakistan[2], the Sinai desert[3], North Africa[4] and Nigeria[5] as well as others[6]. Some 
pledges have been announced on the Internet, others in the real world.[7] IS has also publicly accepted some 
of these pledges as signs of its expansion[8], although they appear to be carefully vetted and are therefore not 
always (immediately) approved by al-Baghdadi.[9]
Such expressions of allegiance to IS may give the impression that bay‘a is something radical Muslims 
agree upon. This is not the case, however. Given the long roots of the concept in Islamic tradition and the 
controversial claim by IS to be a caliphate, the pledge of allegiance to al-Baghdadi and his group is a contested 
issue among radical Islamists. Based on secondary literature and IS ideologues’ own writings, this paper 
analyses IS’s claims of validity in their calls for allegiance to “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This topic has 
briefly been dealt with by Cole Bunzel in his analysis of IS’s claim to be a caliphate[10], but it merits further 
attention because much of the discussion on IS’ legitimacy partly hinges on this concept. In what follows, 
I will first deal with the meaning and application of the concept of bay‘a in classical and modern Islam and 
then show how the Islamic State legitimises the pledge of allegiance to its supposed caliph. As we will see, 
much of the discussion on bay‘a pivots around the question of whether or not IS is a legitimate caliphate. 
Moreover, although its critics are in favour of a caliphate in theory, they seem to shy away from it in practice.
Bay‘a in Classical and Modern Islam
The meaning of the term “bay‘a” is not entirely clear. It is said to refer to the Arabic verb ba‘a-yabi‘u (to 
sell), which would denote a sort of sale of one’s allegiance to somebody else. Others claim it is rooted in the 
physical act of clasping someone’s hand known as “bay‘a”, which was used to indicate the conclusion of an 
agreement between people and was based on an ancient Arab custom. This latter meaning is said to have 
been applied to the election of and submission to a leader, which similarly involved the clasping of a person’s 
99ISSN  2334-3745 August 2015
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 9, Issue 4
hand and was therefore naturally also labelled “bay‘a”.[11] It is in the latter sense that early Muslims seem 
to have used the concept. Milton tells the story of believers pledging allegiance to the Prophet by physically 
touching Muhammad through the holding of hands. This allegedly led to the revelation of Qur’an 48:18[12], 
which states that “God was well pleased with the believers when they were swearing fealty to thee (idh 
yubayi‘unaka).”[13]
Bay‘a and the Caliphate
Broadly speaking, this pledging of allegiance to a person of authority has become the practical meaning of 
the term “bay‘a” in Islam. It was first and foremost applied to the Prophet but, after his death, also to other 
leaders of the Muslim community, primarily the caliph, the successor to the Prophet in political affairs and in 
upholding Islamic rule. This pledge of allegiance to a caliph would ideally take place through his election, but 
it could also happen through appointment by his predecessor. According to ‘ulama’ (Muslim scholars), the 
caliph himself had to satisfy several conditions, including ruling on the basis of justice (‘adala), possessing 
knowledge (‘ilm) of Islamic tradition and law, having physical and mental fitness, being courageous and 
determined, waging jihad and being a descendant of the Quraysh tribe, which the Prophet Muhammad 
himself also belonged to.[14]
The bay‘a of a caliph thus constituted a contract (‘ahd or ‘aqd) in which not only the latter was involved as the 
person receiving fealty, but also those voluntarily expressing the wish to obey their leader. The ‘ulama’ differ, 
however, on the number of people required to pledge allegiance by electing the caliph (ahl al-ikhtiyar) for the 
bay‘a to be legitimate, ranging from all “upright men” in Muslim empires to a single person. In practice, the 
actual electors were mostly officials with senior positions in the caliphate referred to generally as the “people 
of loosening and binding” (ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd), whose oaths of fealty were seen as binding upon themselves 
and the larger Muslim community, particularly since they were not just undertaken towards the caliph, but 
– by extension – also towards God. As such, scholars saw violating the bay‘a as punishable by death, unless 
the caliph did not live up to his duty to uphold the rules and regulations of Islam, in which case those who 
pledged allegiance were freed from their obligations towards the ruler.[15]
The seriousness with which (a violation of) the bay‘a was treated by the ‘ulama’ is a reflection of the strong 
tradition of obedience (ta‘a) to the caliph that had developed in the Sunni Islamic tradition.[16] On the one 
hand, this can be ascribed to the supposed Qur’anic basis of the caliphate[17], which is said to be found in 
verses such as Q. 2:30 (“And when thy Lord said to the angels, ‘I am setting in the earth a viceroy (inni ja‘il 
fi l-ard khalifa)’”)[18], as well as the Qur’an’s call on believers to express obedience to such rulers, as in Q. 
4:59 (“Oh believers, obey God (ati‘u llah), and obey the Messenger (wa-ati‘u l-rasul) and those in authority 
among you (wa-uli l-amr minkum)”).[19] On the other hand, such obedience was also inspired by the belief 
that almost anything (even an unjust and oppressive ruler) was preferable to fitna (chaos, strife) and civil 
war among Muslims in the absence of powerful leadership, which might cause the entire Islamic empire to 
collapse.[20]
At the same time, however, it was clear that in practice, bay‘a could not be expressed to the caliph by every 
single Muslim, even if the process of pledging allegiance was not confined to a private oath by a limited 
number of dignitaries (bay‘at al-khassa) and a variable number of subsequent public fealty-swearing 
occasions (bay‘at al-‘amma) was added.[21] Moreover, the Muslim world may have been nominally ruled by 
a caliph, but local leaders soon emerged whose actual power was sometimes greater than that of the ruler 
himself, further complicating the direct bay‘a from the people to the caliph. Given that in classical Islamic 
100ISSN  2334-3745 August 2015
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 9, Issue 4
political thought, all power flows down from the caliph and other sources of political authority cannot 
exist[22], a solution had to be found for this.
Muslim scholars such as al-Mawardi (974-1058) solved the contradiction – between theoretically only having 
one caliph who enjoys everyone’s allegiance and practically having several actual rulers – by describing local 
leaders as at least theoretically subservient to the caliph and dependent on the latter’s approval.[23] Later 
‘ulama’ tended more towards the recognition of the authority of non-caliphal rulers in and of themselves, 
besides the caliph.[24] In the writings of al-Ghazali (1058-1111), the actual person in power – the sultan 
– must still pledge allegiance to the caliph, but he is also the one who gets to decide who the caliph should 
be.[25] The role of the sultan was further increased at the expense of the caliph by the scholar Ibn Jama‘a 
(1241-1333), who added the usurpation of caliphal power to the other two ways of attaining the caliphate – 
election and appointment – as a legitimate way of becoming caliph.[26] Under the Ottoman Empire (1299-
1923), sultans even came to claim the title of caliph entirely for themselves, taking the usurpation of the 
caliphate to what could be described as its logical conclusion.[27]
Bay‘a after the Fall of the Caliphate
The above makes clear that the way the power and position of the caliph was legitimised by Muslim 
scholars shifted quite dramatically from absolute ruler to nominal leader. Subsequently, so did the means 
of making a pledge to his successor, changing from bay‘a through election of a new caliph or allegiance 
after the appointment by the previous caliph to implied loyalty to a usurping ruler. The development of 
Muslim thinking on these issues was greatly influenced by the actual practice of Islamic rule in their time, 
incorporating political reality into the theory of what constituted a valid bay‘a.[28] Thus, it was not a great 
surprise that the Ottoman sultans, who were clearly not descendents of the Quraysh tribe and therefore 
did not fulfil one of the conditions of the caliphate, nevertheless made use of the classical bay‘a ceremony 
whenever a new ruler became sultan.[29]
With the annulment of the caliphate by the newly formed Turkish republic in 1924, the whole idea of bay‘a 
to the caliph became obsolete. Given the flexible application of the concept, whose use was seemingly always 
partly a reflection of political considerations and power relations, it was only natural that the rulers of the 
states that arose in the Middle East after the demise of colonialism would use the concept of bay‘a again to 
legitimise their own rule.[30] Moreover, in the perceived absence of truly Islamic states, Muslim groups and 
organisations have sometimes also used bay‘a to indicate the relationship between their leaders and followers. 
This has been particularly the case with radical Islamist groups, including al-Qa‘ida[31], whose belief that the 
rulers of the modern-day Muslim world are “apostates” only strengthens their desire to provide an alternative 
to them.[32]
Muslim scholars opposed to political parties and certainly radical or violent groups, such as quietist Salafi 
scholars, reject the application of bay‘a to organisational leaders[33] and claim instead that such a pledge 
should only be given to the ruler, by which they usually mean the king or president of their country.[34] Yet 
the terms they associate with this pledge – ta‘a, wali l-amr (ruler) and, of course, bay‘a itself – are all strongly 
linked to the caliph. Thus, while they clearly apply the caliphal mandate to their country’s rulers in practice, 
they are quite vague about this in theory and have apparently not allowed bay‘a to make the theoretical leap 
from caliph to king. This ambiguity is at least partly kept alive by their use of the term amir al-mu’minin 
(leader of the faithful), which is a title applied to the caliph but has also been used to describe other rulers. As 
a consequence, some scholars’ practical application of bay‘a to contemporary kings seems to be an acceptance 
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of reality framed in classical Islamic terms, rather than a new theoretical dimension of an age-old concept.
[35] This ambiguity towards the modern-day applicability of bay‘a, combined with the claim by Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi to be the new caliph according to at least some of the norms of classical Islam, makes IS’ call for 
allegiance seem at least somewhat plausible. This, in turn, has hampered critics of IS in their efforts to refute 
the validity of the Islamic State’s bay‘a, to which we must now turn.
Bay‘a in IS’s Discourse and its Radical Islamist Critics
The supporters of the Islamic State now label their organisation a caliphate and its leader has assumed the 
title of caliph. This was not always the case, however, since IS used to be known under various other names, 
including “the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham” (ISIS). Even when the group did not claim to be a caliphate, 
however, the concept of “bay‘a” played a significant role in its discourse in a way that sometimes seemed to 
lay the groundwork for the foundation of the caliphate that was still to come.
Preparing for the Caliphate
One of the most prominent scholars involved in the debate on bay‘a of IS (and, before 29 June 2014, ISIS) 
was the Mauritanian scholar Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti, a prolific scholar about whom little is known other 
than his early support for ISIS. He stated in early 2013 that founding an Islamic state is important because 
in it lies “a reminder to the Muslims of the absent caliphate.”[36] This theme of having a caliph or imam[37] 
was developed further in a different document written by al-Shinqiti, in which he stated that appointing such 
a leader is actually a duty for all Muslims.[38] In fact, al-Shinqiti even stated that “its delay is disobedience 
(ma‘siya) through which all Muslims sin”[39], a sentiment that was echoed by other scholars sympathetic to 
ISIS in early 2014.[40]
The duty to appoint a caliph is followed, according to al-Shinqiti, by the equally necessary act of bay‘a to a 
leader who fits all the criteria of such a ruler. Objecting to this, he states, is forbidden and he lists examples 
from early Islamic history of Muslims rushing to perform bay‘a to make his point.[41] Al-Shinqiti also 
explicitly called on other jihadi movements in Iraq and Syria to pledge allegiance to ISIS and stated that 
maintaining one’s independence from that group is not allowed.[42] This is even the case, he claimed, if 
ISIS can be accused of making mistakes. “Despite that”, al-Shinqiti maintained, “the state remains the state. 
It is entitled to the legitimate pledge (al-bay‘a al-shar‘iyya) and listening to it and obeying it (al-sam‘ wa-
l-ta‘a la-ha) is a duty.”[43] This need to be obedient to ISIS was also stressed in other writings, with one 
ISIS-supporting scholar going so far as to state that this group supersedes all other jihadi organisations and 
that not joining it will result in corruption (fasad) and the division of Muslims (tafriq al-muslimin).[44] It is 
therefore not surprising that, in early 2014, the Jordanian scholar ‘Umar b. Mahdi Al Zaydan called on Abu 
Muhammad al-Jawlani, the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra – which had been founded by ISIS but later turned 
against it – to stick to his previous bay‘a to al-Baghdadi, adding that he was the one that sent al-Jawlani to 
Syria on his behalf in the first place.[45]
To his supporters, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was more than worthy of people’s bay‘a. The Bahraini scholar 
Turki al-Bin‘ali (also known as Abu Humam al-Athari)[46] praised al-Baghdadi’s Qurashi descent, piety, 
knowledge, jihad experience, leadership, and cooperation skills.[47] Al-Baghdadi’s supporters rejected 
possible obstacles to pledging fealty to al-Baghdadi, such as the argument that ISIS had not settled in 
enough territory to justify bay‘a to its leader. The technical expression for this idea is that ISIS lacks tamkin 
(empowerment). Tamkin, however, is not a prerequisite for bay‘a, pro-ISIS scholars argued, because 
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Muhammad himself did not control any territory and he was nevertheless given the pledge by his followers.
[48] Moreover, they pointed out that ISIS does have territory under its control.[49] The same reasoning 
applied to ISIS’s power (shawka), which it needs to be able to qualify as a force to be reckoned with (and 
pledged allegiance to).[50]
The scholars supporting ISIS similarly pointed out that having few bay‘as from people is not an objection 
to being viewed as legitimate. As long as a small number pledge allegiance, that suffices.[51] Also, they 
dismissed the idea that al-Baghdadi should be well known to deserve the bay‘a and cite the aforementioned 
medieval scholar al-Mawardi to point out that a ruler need only be known to those directly involved in 
electing him.[52] Given the flexible rules on how bay‘a should be given (through election, by appointment or 
after usurpation), citing al-Mawardi here does not seem out of place, in fact. For similar reasons, the pro-ISIS 
scholars claimed that the permission of the ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd or the consultation (shura) of the scholars 
is not strictly necessary and only advisable.[53] Moreover, al-Athari claimed that al-Baghdadi did consult 
‘ulama’ and that they agreed with him.[54]
IS’s Post-Caliphate Bay‘a
Given the case pro-ISIS scholars made for the bay‘a to al-Baghdadi, the founding of a caliphate was perhaps 
only a matter of time. When it was announced, however, there was a lot of criticism from radical Islamist 
scholars who supported al-Qa‘ida but found the newly announced IS a bridge too far. Some radical Islamist 
critics point out that they do not object to a caliphate as such, of course, but that IS has created divisions with 
its caliphate by leaving the overarching framework formed by al-Qa‘ida, and they advise its leaders to correct 
their mistakes and return to that organisation.[55] Others refer to stricter conditions for a bay‘a-worthy 
caliphate by pointing out that only succession and election through the majority of the ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd 
are valid forms of giving allegiance to the caliph.[56]
More interesting than this general criticism is the argument that there already was a caliph: Taliban leader 
Mullah ‘Umar. As Bunzel has shown, after the announcement of the caliphate by IS, al-Qa‘ida – clearly aware 
of IS’s challenge to its previously almost undisputed role of jihadi king of the hill – began promoting the view 
that its first leader, Osama bin Laden, had pledged a “supreme bay‘a” to Mullah ‘Umar, thereby indicating 
that he was the caliph and that al-Baghdadi’s claims were null and void. Although this line of thinking was 
muddled somewhat by the fact that the current leader of al-Qa‘ida, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had apparently 
been less unambiguous in his bay‘a to Mullah ‘Umar, the organisation stuck to this defence of their “own” 
caliphate.[57]
Al-Qa‘ida’s line of defence against IS’s rival caliphate was supported – surprisingly – by one of the staunchest 
supporters of ISIS: Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti. The latter stated in July 2014 that bay‘a had been given to 
Mullah ‘Umar and even if his rule was not generally portrayed as a caliphate, this was nevertheless the case 
because of this pledge. The fact that “unbelievers” were now governing Afghanistan did not diminish Mullah 
‘Umar’s bay‘a since, in an echo of an argument he had used earlier to defend ISIS, controlling territory is not 
strictly necessary for a bay‘a to be valid. All bay‘as, al-Shinqiti maintained, are subservient to the one given 
to Mullah ‘Umar, who is the legitimate imam whether people call him that way or not, and one therefore 
cannot simply found a second caliphate.[58] The fact that Mullah ‘Umar does not have Qurashi origins is not 
a problem, al-Shinqiti claimed, since people have already given bay‘a to him on the basis of the conditions of 
being an imam and have based their pledge on these.[59] The reality of the bay‘a to Mullah ‘Umar, al-Shinqiti 
seemed to say, supersedes any claims that al-Baghdadi might have.
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Al-Shinqiti’s words seemed to contradict his own earlier statement about ISIS: “…the ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd 
who pledged allegiance to the leader of the state of Islam (i.e., ISIS) called it a ‘state’. They did not call it an 
‘organisation’. Therein lies the clear proof that their bay‘a is a bay‘a on the basis of the supreme imamate (al-
imama al-‘uzma), not on the basis of the smaller imamate (al-imama al-sughra).”[60] Although al-Shinqiti 
had, in fact, indicated more than a year before the announcement of IS’s caliphate that he believed Mullah 
‘Umar was “the leader of the faithful”[61], supporters of IS were quick to point out his inconsistency.[62] 
Some of them argued that the Taliban cannot represent the caliphate because of their supposedly deviant 
religious views[63]; others pointed out that according to al-Qa‘ida itself, the bay‘a to Mullah ‘Umar did not 
represent allegiance to the supreme imamate, but only to a partial one.[64] Still others stated that the bay‘a 
is a contract of which both parties involved want to know the conditions: “How can Mullah ‘Umar be caliph 
when nobody has known that until now!”[65] Another point of disagreement concerned the validity of the 
bay‘a to a supposed caliph of non-Qurashi descent. IS supporters insisted that this is a strict condition for 
the caliphate and thus also for the legitimacy of the bay‘a.[66] The validity of the latter concept, even though 
it is claimed by scholars who are ideologically largely alike and is derived from classical Islam, thus remains 
highly contested.
Conclusion
The concept of bay‘a in classical Islam refers to a reciprocal contract between the ruler and the ruled, with 
the latter giving his allegiance to the leader – usually the caliph – in exchange for protection and political and 
military leadership. It has its roots in the Qur’an, but mostly also in the practice of medieval Muslim rule, 
which ensured that the process of bay‘a – while ideally done through an election of a caliph – developed into 
a concept that could also be embodied by the appointment of a ruler or even the usurpation of his power. 
This increasing influence of what could be termed a “might makes right philosophy” was also discernable in 
the early jurists’ conditions for bay‘a to the caliph, especially his required Qurashi descent, which was often 
flouted by rulers.
Although various caliphs, modern-day kings and Islamic groups have used the bay‘a in ways that perhaps 
deviate from the concept’s classical meaning, the theoretical link with the caliph was always maintained. This 
made it relatively easy for IS to justify its invitation to Muslims to pledge allegiance to its newly founded 
caliphate in 2014. The fact that IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi claimed to be a caliph seemed to make at least 
part of the tradition of bay‘a applicable to him and put the group one step ahead of its radical Islamist critics. 
It is therefore not surprising that IS’s jihadi opponents, in their efforts to dispute the validity of bay‘a to al-
Baghdadi, focused mostly on questioning his claim to be a caliph.
Given the relatively wide-ranging bay‘a tradition, which is quite tolerant of oppressive and usurping rulers 
and within which IS seems to fit fairly neatly, the unwillingness of the Islamic State’s radical Islamist critics 
to accept the group’s claims is interesting. To be sure, there are real and important ideological differences 
between IS and its critics. Yet with regard to bay‘a, IS’s arguments resemble quite closely the theories that its 
jihadi opponents themselves claim to adhere to. Although the latter take their inspiration from early Islam 
and far less so from the theories that developed afterwards, it sometimes appears as if they have idealised 
the caliphate to such an extent that they find its reality as represented by IS hard to swallow. If that is indeed 
the case, it may be easier for them to postpone the announcement of an actual caliphate, to render it largely 
theoretical and to equate it with a romanticised ideal that might just come about one day.
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